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WHEN PUNISHING INNOCENT CONDUCT
VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:





This Comment will discuss the state of the forty-year-old
constitutional principle (the so-called "Robinson doctrine") that criminally
sanctioning a person's membership in a status violates the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' A corollary to the doctrine
is that the state is free, at least under the Eighth Amendment, to punish
2
conduct, so long as it is not punishing mere status.
Today, the Robinson doctrine is in some ways a dead letter3 because
legislatures are seemingly free-barring non-Eighth Amendment
constitutional restrictions-to criminalize any conduct they want.4
* The author would like to thank his family for their love and moral support; Professor
Jack Heinz, who provided the inspiration for this Comment and who gave generously of his
time and wisdom as it was being written; and Justice Alex McDonald of the California Court
of Appeals, who gave the final draft an extremely careful and intelligent read.
I See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); see also Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
2 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 532; Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664.
3 Indeed, a contemporary account of Robinson's impact predicted that "unless Robinson
is to be 'a derelict on the waters of the law,' the Court itself will have to refine its decision
and provide a reasonably clear constitutional rationale upon which it can be based, and
according to which similar cases can be decided." Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 655 (1966) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause]. The Court has not
fulfilled the note author's desire for a "clear constitutional rationale" and has not addressed
the Robinson doctrine since 1968.
4 See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 943, 965-66 (1999); Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A
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However, the doctrine continues to be invoked by homeless litigants
challenging laws that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct-such as
sleeping, eating, and urinating-that becomes unlawful when performed in
public,5 and by defendants who are addicted to alcohol and who claim they
are being punished for their status as alcoholics. 6 Although the laws these
litigants challenge do not, as a technical matter, punish the status of
homelessness or alcoholism, they do create situations in which it becomes
impossible for homeless people or alcoholics not to break the law.7 Thus,
while such laws technically punish acts in accordance with Robinson, the
acts they punish-particularly those targeted by laws challenged by the
homeless-are often innocent, life-sustaining, and/or reflexive.8
The semantic distinction between status and act is somewhat tenuous
to begin with, and in the context of homelessness and chronic alcoholism, it
arguably loses all meaning, since being a member of a given status may
make it impossible to avoid performing certain actions.9 However, an
alternative reading of Robinson that would protect the homeless from
"camping ordinances" that punish public conduct-under which reading the
state would have the power to punish only volitional behavior'0-seems to
lead to a slippery slope: if we cannot punish acts that derive from status,
then punishing even exceptionally culpable conduct may be considered
cruel and unusual if the behavior is compulsive.l'
In the past decade, courts and scholars have struggled to define a
principle that would prevent the state from imposing liability on the
Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 317-18
(1996).
5 See discussion infra Part Ill.
6 See People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 122 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
7 See Wes Daniels, "Derelicts, " Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and
Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal
Advocates, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 687, 707-08 (1997); Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral:
Homelessness and its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 41 (1996); Robert C.
McConkey, III, "Camping Ordinances " and the Homeless: Constitutional and Moral Issues
Raised by Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Public Areas, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 633, 643
(1995); Smith, supra note 4, at 328; June Rene Fox, Comment, Constitutionality of the
Arrest of the Homeless Under the Basis of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 20 W. ST. U. L.
REv. 649, 657 (1993).
8 See In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("Sleep is a
physiological need, not an option for humans."); Daniels, supra note 7, at 705.
9 See The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, supra note 3, at 651 ("[Tlhe question
arises whether a prohibition against punishment for the condition would also extend to
certain acts closely related to the condition.").
10 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 568 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 534.
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homeless for conduct like sleeping and eating in public without creating a
rule that would de-criminalize conduct that is truly culpable. 12  This
Comment will argue that such a principle exists. Under the Eighth
Amendment, innocent conduct may be de-criminalized without de-
criminalizing culpable conduct if courts ignore the semantic categories of
"status" and "conduct," and make objective determinations about whether
targeted conduct is innocent or culpable.
Whether conduct is innocent or culpable may seem overly vulnerable
to arbitrary determination. However, this determination may be made
objectively by referring to the criminal code where the challenged statute is
codified. If the code criminalizes conduct in all circumstances-for
instance, premeditated homicide-then that conduct is culpable. If the code
criminalizes conduct only in a certain context-e.g., sleeping in public-
then the conduct is innocent. 13 Of course, some innocent conduct becomes
culpable in certain contexts-driving is culpable behavior when the driver
is drunk-but if a person cannot avoid the context in which his innocent
conduct becomes criminal conduct, he should be exempt from criminalprosecution. 14 This approach will not only yield fairer outcomes to litigants
who are prosecuted for victimless conduct. It will also yield public policy
benefits by compelling states and cities to address their homeless problems.
Before proposing a new way of interpreting and applying the Robinson
doctrine, this Comment will examine the history of the doctrine and its
applications in a variety of legal contexts. The section immediately
following will discuss the doctrinal framework-beginning with Robinson
v. California-against which laws banning innocent conduct derivative of a
litigant's status are challenged, and will dissect the reasoning behind the
12 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Church v. City of
Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D.
Tex. 1994); Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla.
1992); Smith, supra note 4, at 319-21.
13 See infra Part VI.
14 This contextual approach is not unrelated to the common law defense of necessity.
The difference lies in the burden of proof. The necessity defense is an affirmative defense
that the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re
Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). In Eichorn, a California appeals
court held that a homeless defendant could raise a necessity defense to a camping ordinance
under factual circumstances where all of the shelter beds within the municipality were filled
on the night of his arrest. Id. at 536; see also Antonia K. Fassanelli, Note, In re Eichorn: The
Long Awaited Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the Criminalization of
Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 324-25 (2000).
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Supreme Court precedents that produced the doctrine. 15  Part III is a
discussion of two recent cases involving alcoholic defendants-a homeless
defendant who is a chronic alcoholic, 16 and an alcoholic who was
"interdicted" by the state of Virginia and then charged with violating an
interdiction order by purchasing alcohol 17-- and will examine how modem
courts have applied the Robinson doctrine.' 8 In both cases, the defendants'
Robinson arguments were rejected.' 9 The statutes at issue in these cases
reveal how judicial application of the Robinson doctrine allows legislatures
to rely on the criminal law to target social problems as a substitute for
complex, non-punitive solutions.2°
Part IV will discuss two leading cases2' involving classes of homeless
litigants challenging camping ordinances. 22  These cases reveal how
alternative readings of the Robinson doctrine lead to divergent outcomes,
and enable courts to manipulate definitions of status and conduct.23 Part V
will discuss the policy arguments in favor of, and against, camping
ordinances, and will argue that declaring these laws unconstitutional will
yield public policy benefits.24 Finally, Part VI will propose an alternative
interpretation of the Robinson doctrine that will permit the State to target
culpable conduct, but prevent legislatures from persecuting the homeless
and other litigants who have no choice but to break the law.
25
II. BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted., 26 In 1962, the Supreme Court
decided in Robinson v. California that a statute making it a crime to be
addicted to narcotics was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.27
"5 See infra Part II.
16 People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
17 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 122 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
" See infra Part Ill.
19 See Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 516; Jackson, 604 S.E.2d at 126.
20 See infra Part ILL.
21 Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
22 See infra Part IV.
23 See infra Part IV.
24 See infra Part V.
25 See infra Part VI.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
27 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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The few facts of Robinson described by the Court are unremarkable.
Robinson was arrested in Los Angeles after a police officer "had occasion
to examine [his] arms one evening., 28 This officer testified at Robinson's
jury trial that he had "observed 'scar tissue and discoloration on the inside"'
of Robinson's right arm. 29 He also testified that Robinson "admitted to the
occasional use of narcotics., 30 Another police officer testified, apparently
as an expert, that the marks on Robinson's arms were the result of the use
of hypodermic needles to inject narcotics. 3  Robinson testified that the
marks on his arm actually resulted "from an allergic condition contracted
during his military service," and denied having admitted to his arresting
officer that he used drugs.32 Two witnesses corroborated his testimony.33
The trial judge instructed the jury that Robinson could be convicted
under the statute either for using, or being addicted to, narcotics.34 He
explained that
[tjo be addicted to the use of narcotics is said to be a status or condition and not an
act. It is a continuing offense and differs from most other offenses in the fact that [it]
is chronic rather than acute; that it continues after it is complete and subjects the
offender to arrest at any time before he reforms.
35
The jury convicted Robinson "of the offense charged. 3 6 Apparently,
it did not return a special verdict, so whether Robinson was convicted for
using or being addicted to drugs is unclear.37 In any event, Robinson's
conviction was upheld by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which,
by statute, was the ultimate state appellate avenue available to Robinson.38
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 39 The Court declared that
criminally sanctioning Robinson solely for his addiction was, in and of
itself, cruel and unusual and analogized punishing drug addiction to
punishing an illness:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a
criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a
28 Id. at 661.
29 id.
30 Id.




35 Id. at 662-63 (alteration in original).
36 Id. at 663 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 664
'9 Id. at 669.
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venereal disease .... [l]n light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made
a criminal offense of such [diseases] would doubtless be universally thought to be an
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment... We cannot but consider the [California
statute] as of the same category.
Robinson's holding that a person cannot be held criminally liable
simply for being addicted to drugs seems straightforward. As one
contemporary scholar put it, however, "Robinson raise[d] many more
questions than it answer[ed]., 41 Broadly speaking, the case announced a
novel constitutional principle, namely that the Eighth Amendment could be
used "to limit the concept of a 'crime,"' to the point where the state,
"despite its legitimate interest in suppressing and correcting a socially
harmful condition, may not without violating standards of decency impose
criminal sanctions. 42  That principle seemed to offer "the promise of
making fault a constitutional requirement., 43  Some, however, viewed
Robinson not as a "promise" but as a "portent" of judicial encroachment
into the substantive (as opposed to procedural) criminal law, which was
traditionally the domain of the States, and of the establishment of a "lack of
self-control as a constitutional bar to punishment.",
44
Even when the Court itself seemingly limited Robinson's holding six
years after it was decided,45 there remained-and remains--controversy
over whether the case should be read broadly (i.e., requiring volition for
criminal liability) or narrowly (i.e., proscribing only the direct
criminalization of status).46
A. EXPANDING ROBINSON BEYOND DRUG ADDICTION
Justice Stewart wrote for the majority in Robinson, and his opinion
offers some initial clues as to how the case should be read. Most
significantly, Stewart's comparison of drug addiction to illness47 remains
important for three reasons. First, it clarifies the Court's position that what
40 Id. at 666-67.
41 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, supra note 3, at 655.
42 id.
43 Kadish, supra note 4, at 965.
44id.
41 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534 (1968).
46 Compare Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law
and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 20-23 (1988) (arguing that
Robinson and Powell stand for the principle that non-volitional conduct should not be
punished), with Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2286 n.149 (1992) (arguing that the holding in Robinson prohibits
only punishing "mere status" as opposed to "positive conduct").
47 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
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is cruel and unusual about criminalizing addiction is not the confinement of
addicts, but simply the labeling of addicts as criminal. 5 This argument
differs from the Eighth Amendment "proportionality principle," which the
Court has used in deciding, for example, the constitutionality of "third
strike" statutes under which recidivists may receive long prison sentences
for minor offenses.49 With respect to punishing drug addiction, the cruelty
and unusualness derive not from the harshness of the sentence imposed on
the addict, but rather from the fact of punishment itself.50 Therefore, the bar
on imposing criminal liability for drug addiction is absolute.
The second reason for the importance of Justice Stewart's comparison
of drug addiction to illness is that it suggested that Robinson's holding was
not limited to drug addiction, but could be expanded to other conditions or
statuses.5 Indeed, the very list of diseases that Stewart used by way of
example seems to indicate that the holding might expand rather far.
52
Mental illness and leprosy, Stewart's first two examples, are typically
contracted through no fault of those who are afflicted with them, while
venereal disease may well be contracted through voluntary, and even
culpable, behavior. 53 Meanwhile, leprosy and venereal disease are usually
physical afflictions, while mental illness is not.54 Similarly, leprosy and
48 Id. at 665 ("[A] State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for those
addicted to narcotics . . . [which] might require periods of involuntary confinement.")
(footnote omitted). Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, expanded on the addiction-as-illness
theme, providing a catalog of opinions from medical and legal sources that "[t]he addict is a
sick person." Id. at 668-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).
49 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
50 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 ("Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."); see English, supra note 46, at 23
("In Robinson . . . the Court extended eighth amendment analysis to include the very
definition of criminality.").
5t Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67.
52 Id.
53 See, e.g., Dawn Capp & Joan G. Esnayra, Perspective: It's All in Your Head--
Defining Psychiatric Disabilities as Physical Disabilities, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 97, 99
(2000) ("Many mental illnesses have strong hereditary components."); Maureen Anne
MacFarlane, Note and Comment, Equal Opportunities: Protecting the Rights of AIDS-
Linked Children in the Classroom, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 383 (1989) (noting that leprosy
"can be transmitted easily through casual conduct").
54 See, e.g., Gary J. Ruckelshaus, Casenote: Fourteenth Amendment & 42 US.C. 12182 -
The Americans With Disabilities Act Of 1990 - Persons With Asymptomatic HIV Infection
Are Entitled to ADA Protection from Discrimination and Such Condition Qualifies as a
Physical Impairment that Substantially Limits the Major Life Activity of Reproduction-
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 241, 242 n.8 (1998)
("External symptoms of leprosy typically include gross limb paralysis and deformity,
ulceration, oozing wounds, blindness, gangrene and skin growths."); Jeffrey Crane, Clinical
Trial for Herpes Drug Enlists University Students, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 20, 1992, at 12.
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venereal disease may be contagious, while mental illness cannot be. Thus,
Stewart's analogy suggests that criminalizing any status violates the Eighth
Amendment, regardless of whether that status is physical or mental, and
even if it is attained through voluntary-and culpable-behavior.
The third reason the comparison between addiction and illness is
important is because Justice Stewart's claim that no "State at this moment
in history" would likely pass a law punishing illness 56 seemed to allude to
the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine that what is cruel and unusual
depends on "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society. 57 Stewart's invocation of Trop v. Dulles suggests that
the Robinson doctrine is not a static doctrine. In the context of
homelessness, the dynamism of the doctrine is vital, particularly because
Robinson was decided a generation before homelessness became a high-
profile political issue.58
B. THE ARGUMENT FOR LIMITING ROBINSON
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Robinson pointed out the
potential consequences of the Court's holding: "If it is 'cruel and unusual
punishment' to convict appellant for addiction, it is difficult to understand
why it would be any less offensive. . . to convict him for use on the same
evidence of use which proved he was an addict." 59 In other words, White
cautioned, the line between the status of addiction and the act of satiating
that addiction has nothing to do with the cruelty and unusualness of
criminally sanctioning an addict, and may easily be eroded to the point
where the Eighth Amendment will bar the punishment of any purportedly
involuntary conduct.60
55 See, e.g., MacFarlane, supra note 53, at 383; Lesley Clark, Syphilis Rate Drops, but
Officials Keep Up Guard, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Oct. 23, 1994, at 1.
56 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
57 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Justice Douglas's concurrence in Robinson
employed similar reasoning, analogizing drug addiction to insanity and pointing out that
while the insane "may be confined either for treatment or for the protection of society, they
are not branded as criminals." 370 U.S. at 668-69 (Douglas, J., concurring).
58 See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS 1 (1994); Carol L. M. Caton, Homelessness
in Historical Perspective, in HOMELESS IN AMERICA 3, 17 (Carol L. M. Caton ed., 1990).
59 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 688 (White, J., dissenting).
60 This consequentialist argument was taken to its extreme in Justice Marshall's plurality
opinion in Powell v. Texas. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69. The majority opinion
in Robinson did not address White's admonition, although it did provide a limiting dictum at
least with respect to narcotics: "The broad power of the State to regulate the narcotic drugs
traffic within its borders is not here in issue .... A State might impose criminal sanctions, for
example, against the unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of
narcotics within its borders." 370 U.S. at 664.
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Six years after Robinson, in Powell v. Texas,6 1 a four-Justice plurality
heeded Justice White's warning and seemingly flattened the potential
slippery slope established by the earlier case. In Powell, the Court
considered the case of an alcoholic who had been found guilty of public
62 "clieintoxication and fined twenty dollars. Powell claimed that his drinking
was uncontrollable, and that he was therefore being punished for his status
as an alcoholic in violation of the Eighth Amendment.63
Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality, upheld Powell's conviction,
and reasoned that the State may charge a chronic alcoholic with public
intoxication without violating the Eighth Amendment. 64 Marshall wrote
that the state, in criminalizing public intoxication, is "impos[ing] upon [the
alcoholic] a criminal sanction for public behavior which ... seems a far cry
from convicting one for being an addict, being a chronic alcoholic, being
'mentally ill or a leper.' ' 65 Marshall's opinion echoed White's dissent in
Robinson, arguing that if punishing acts derivative of a status (as opposed to
punishing the status itself) violated the Eighth Amendment, then the result
"could only be a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility. 66
Taking this argument to its extreme, Justice Marshall reasoned that, if
Robinson could be extended to prohibit punishing compulsive behavior
arising from one's membership in a status, then "it is difficult to see how a
State can convict an individual for murder, if that individual, while
exhibiting normal behavior in all other respects, suffers from a
'compulsion' to kill."67 The Powell plurality sought to limit Robinson's
holding to a simple principle: "criminal penalties may only be inflicted if
the accused has committed some act.",68 Robinson thus did not decide "the
question of whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished
because it is, in some sense, 'involuntary' or 'occasioned by a
compulsion.' ' 69 Simply put, the state may not punish status, but under the
70Eighth Amendment at least, it may punish any and all conduct it chooses.
61 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
62 Id. at 517.
63 Id. at 532.
64 id
65 Id. (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 534.
67 id.





C. TWO CONFLICTING READINGS OF ROBINSON AND POWELL
In spite of the Powell plurality's apparent neutralization of Robinson,
the collective meaning of Robinson and Powell remains ambiguous, in large
part because the concurring opinion of Justice White in Powell-the same
Justice White who dissented in Robinson7 1-seemed to disagree with the
plurality on its limitation of the earlier case.72  White cast the fifth and
deciding vote in Powell, but in his concurrence he emphasized that his vote
was limited to the facts of the case:
[T]he chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol should not be
punishable for drinking or for being drunk.
Powell's conviction was for the different crime of being drunk in a public place.
Thus even if Powell was compelled to drink, and so could not constitutionally be
convicted for drinking, his conviction in this case can be invalidated only if there is a
constitutional basis for saying that he may not be punished for being in public while
drunk.
73
In other words, Powell's crime was not being drunk; rather it was leaving a
private space where his drunkenness could not be subjected to criminal
liability.
74
As White pointed out, if Powell stayed home, he would not have been
criminally liable.75 Powell was not convicted of being an alcoholic, or even
of being drunk: he was convicted of being drunk in public.76 Thus, the
constitutionally punishable crime of public intoxication would seem to
involve a spatial or contextual element that transforms innocent behavior
into culpable conduct. If the state may punish conduct, but may not punish
status, then this contextual element, which arose in Powell but not in
Robinson, blurs the distinction between status and conduct. As an
71 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685-89 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).
72 See, e.g., Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 38 ("The differences in rulings on the Eighth
Amendment claims [of homeless litigants] can be traced to different interpretations of
[Robinson and Powell]."); McConkey, supra note 7, at 644 ("Thus, under Powell, it appears
that the rule of Robinson does not apply to prohibit punishment of 'involuntary' criminal
acts."); Smith, supra note 4, at 317 ("Because there was not a majority in Powell for
adoption of the 'pure status' rationale, the case has left lower courts without clear guidance
as to whether or not to apply Robinson to 'acts' derivative of status.").
73 Powell, 392 U.S. at 549 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The significance of
White's contention that Powell, the chronic alcoholic, "could not constitutionally be
convicted for drinking," is that drinking is an act. Therefore, White seemed to side with the
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illustration, what if a state made it illegal to walk around outside while
being addicted to drugs? Walking around outside is conduct, but being
addicted to drugs is a status. A person would not be criminally liable for
addiction to drugs until he stepped outside of his house. As a technical
matter, that contextual law would pass the Robinson test for
constitutionality.77 As noted below, however, Justice White's Powell
concurrence raises, without explicitly articulating, the complicating factor
of the contextual element.
78
As a doctrinal matter, it remains unclear whether White's vote should
count towards the plurality's holding that the State may punish any conduct
so long as it is not punishing mere status79-- or, alternatively, whether his
vote should count towards the dissent's interpretation of Robinson, under
which the State may punish only volitional conduct, that is, conduct which
the defendant has the power to prevent.80
77 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
78 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 548-59 (White, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 532 ("On its face the present case does not fall within [Robinson's] holding,
since appellant was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public
while drunk on a particular occasion. The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a
mere status, as California did in Robinson.").
80 Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("Robinson stands upon a principle which, despite its
subtlety, must be simply stated and respectfully applied because it is the foundation of
individual liberty and the cornerstone of relations between a civilized state and its citizens:
Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is
powerless to change."). For the purposes of this Comment, I will refer to the Powell
plurality's interpretation of the Robinson doctrine as the "status/act reading" and the
dissent's interpretation as the "volitional reading." However, this dichotomy between the
status/act and volitional readings is not meant to foreclose additional readings of the
doctrine, including the one endorsed by this Comment. See infra Part VI. Indeed, scholars
have suggested alternative ways of understanding conflicting interpretations of the doctrine.
For example, a contemporary analysis of Robinson argued that the status/act holding of the
case could be read in one of three ways. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, supra
note 3, at 646. First, one could argue that the holding proscribes only "pure status" crimes-
i.e., laws that punish membership in a status that is not predicated on any conduct, as
opposed to laws that punish statuses, membership in which requires certain conduct (for
example, being a "common thief," while a status, is predicated on one's having committed
theft). Id. at 646-47. Second, the holding may be read to proscribe only "involuntary" status
crimes-i.e., laws that punish, for example, drug addicts who are "born to mothers who are
addicts" or whose addiction "may result from medical prescription." Id at 648-49. Finally,
the holding may be read to proscribe punishment of "innocent" status crimes-i.e., laws that
punish membership in a "status one cannot change." Id. at 648. Under this reading, the state
would not be permitted to punish an addict-even one who has become addicted through
conduct that is entirely voluntary-once he is addicted. Id. Building on these three readings
of the "constitutional principles underlying the Robinson holding," a more recent
commentator has added a fourth reading, which she labels the "'human dignity' rationale for
Robinson." Smith, supra note 4, at 314. According to this reading, derived from Justice
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At the time Powell was decided, advocates for reforming the criminal
justice system's treatment of addicts, including Powell's lawyers,
developed the volitional reading, claiming to have lost "on the facts of
[Powell's] case, but [to have] won on the law."'', They claimed that Powell
and Robinson collectively stand for the principle that the state may not
criminally sanction non-volitional conduct. 2  History, however, has not
entirely borne out the success of the volitional reading, as "the more
common [judicial] interpretation has been to treat the plurality opinion as
controlling and Robinson as limited to a proscription of status
criminality."8 3 Nevertheless, some judges have read White's opinion in
Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, imprisoning addicts is tantamount to treating
"members of the human race as nonhumans" and thus is cruel and unusual. Id. at 313-14
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring)). However, this
commentator acknowledges that, "because the definition of 'inhuman' treatment depends on
one's own moral conscience.., this rationale does not offer much help toward developing a
conceptual rubric with which to guide future applications of Robinson." Id. at 314.
81 David Robinson, Jr., Powell v. Texas: The Case of the Intoxicated Shoeshine Man-
Some Reflections a Generation Later by a Participant, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 401, 435 (1999).
82 The doctrinal foundation of the volitional reading is somewhat complex, and warrants
a brief clarification. For the volitional reading to carry the day, the Powell plurality's
holding-that a chronic alcoholic may be convicted of public intoxication-must be limited
to the facts of Powell's case, while Robinson must be extended to include Justice White's
dictum that "[if] it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics, I do
not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a compulsion." Powell, 392
U.S. at 548 (White, J., concurring) ("Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for
addiction under a different name."). Proponents of the volitional reading argue that White's
dictum is congruent with the four dissenters' putative holding that the state may not punish
those who are "powerless to choose not to violate the law," id at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting),
and therefore that White's vote should be added to the dissenters' votes to form a majority
holding on the law. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 316. The volitional reading may be
fortified by White's near joining with the dissenters one month before the Court handed
down its opinion. See Robinson, supra note 81, at 432. However, proponents of the
status/act reading have taken some of the bite out of the volitional reading by pointing out
that Justice White dissented in Robinson, and, after all, concurred in Powell, and speculate
that White's disputed dictum in Powell "was simply illustrating some of the absurdities of
[Robinson's] analysis," by applying it to a hypothetical "slippery slope" scenario. Id. at 431;
see also Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
("One can only hypothesize that Justice White would actually have cast his vote differently
had [Powell] been homeless. Nothing underscores this point more vividly than the fact that
Justice White was one of two vigorous dissenters in Robinson."). Meanwhile, even some
scholars in favor of the constitutionalization of "personal culpability as a condition for
conviction" acknowledge that Powell limited Robinson's holding and point to White's
dissent in Robinson as a "portent." See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 4, at 965 ("Justice
White ... thought Justice Stewart's [majority opinion in Robinson] would logically demand
that it must also be cruel and unusual punishment to punish an addict for using the narcotic
to which he is addicted.").
83 Robinson, supra note 81, at 435.
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Powell as controlling and have applied it to factual situations involving
punishment for non-volitional conduct, as opposed to mere status.
84
It is worth noting as well that the volitional reading has manifested
itself outside of American courthouses. The Model Penal Code suggests a
voluntary act requirement as an element of every offense: "A person is not
guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a
voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically
capable. 85 Several states have incorporated this voluntary act requirement
into their criminal codes. 86  Further, the highest court of Canada has
judicially recognized the requirement, albeit through the due process
provisions of its Charter of Rights and Freedoms.87
White's concurrence in Powell is considered by many to be the closest
the U.S. Supreme Court has come to consummating its "flirtation with the
possibility of a constitutional criminal law doctrine" that would have
mandated a voluntary act requirement.88 However, the status/act reading
remains the dominant judicial interpretation of Robinson and Powell, and
the seemingly bright line the status/act reading draws is frequently cited as
a rationale for giving it preference over the volitional reading.
III. KELLOGG AND JACKSON: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ROBINSON
DOCTRINE
How bright is the line between status and conduct? This section will
discuss two recent cases which have applied strict status/act readings of
Robinson and Powell to the Eighth Amendment claims of criminal
defendants. These cases reveal the arbitrary consequences of drawing a
purely linguistic distinction between status and conduct.
84 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 348-49 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
("Justice White's prescient comments in his concurring opinion relate homelessness to the
issue of status as first conceived in Robinson ...."), rev'd, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995);
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("Although Justice
White joined the majority in rejecting the appellant's challenge to his conviction, he did so
only because he found the record insufficient to support the appellant's claim that his public
alcoholic condition compelled him to appear in public while drunk."); People v. Kellogg, 14
Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (McDonald, J., dissenting). One commentator
who opposes this reading of Powell has pointed out the reluctance of the plurality-and that
of Justice White-to place "constitutional restraints on social policy in the empirically and
normatively complex area of substance abuse." Robinson, supra note 82, at 402. This same
commentator also takes aim at the reasoning of White's opinion. Id. at 431.
85 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1965).
86 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 242 (2005); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(1)
(West 1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301(a) (West 1998).
87 The Queen v. Logan, [1990] S.C.R. 731.
88 Kadish, supra note 4, at 966.
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A. STATE V. KELLOGG: WHITE'S HYPOTHETICAL REALIZED
In June 2004, a California appeals court decided the case of Thomas
Kellogg.89 Kellogg, a homeless alcoholic, had been arrested several times
for public intoxication and sentenced to 180 days in jail.90 He appealed his
conviction, arguing that, because he was both homeless and an alcoholic, he
had no choice but to appear drunk in public, and therefore punishing him
was cruel and unusual. 91
Kellogg's argument relied on the volitional reading of Robinson and
Powell.92 Like Leroy Powell, Thomas Kellogg was convicted of "being
drunk in a public place"-in other words, he was convicted of an act, as
opposed to being punished for his mere "status" of being an alcoholic.
93
Unlike Powell, however, Kellogg "was homeless at the time of his
arrest[]. ' 94 In his Powell concurrence, Justice White indicated that his vote
would have been different were Leroy Powell homeless:
The fact remains that some chronic alcoholics must drink and hence must drink
somewhere. Although many chronics have homes, many others do not. For all
practical purposes the public streets may be home for these unfortunates, not because
their disease compels them to be there, but because, drunk or sober, they have no
place else to go and no place else to be when they are drinking .... For some of these
alcoholics I would think a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness is
impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is also impossible. As
applied to them this statute is in effect a law which bans a single act for which they
may not be convicted under the Eighth Amendment-the act of getting drunk.
95
The majority and dissenting opinions in Kellogg are situated on either
side of the debate over how-as a matter of doctrinal interpretation-to
read Robinson and Powell.96 The dissent, while acknowledging that Justice
White's concurrence in Powell "is not binding on this court," 97 took pains
89 People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
90 Id. at 511.
9' Id. at 508.
92 See supra Part II.C.
9' Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513.
94 Id. at 510.
95 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968) (White, J. concurring) (emphasis omitted).
In a dissenting opinion in Kellogg, Justice McDonald pointed out that the facts of Kellogg
were virtually identical to White's hypothetical scenario of the drunk with no home:
Justice White's concurring opinion in Powell strongly suggests that he would have joined the
four dissenting justices had the record in that case shown the defendant was a chronic alcoholic
who was not homeless by choice and therefore could not have done his drinking in private or
avoid being in public while intoxicated.
14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 526 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
96 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
9' Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 527 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
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to point out that "[f]ive members of the [Powell] Court would extend the
'status crime' rationale to matters other than 'mere' status... if the conduct
were compelled by the condition., 98 The majority was "not persuaded,"99
although it did not specifically dismiss the authority of White's opinion, 00
and, in fact, drew a comparison between the facts of Kellogg and Justice
White's analysis of the facts of Powell.'01
Thus, neither the dissent nor the majority in Kellogg seem willing
either to embrace or to reject Justice White's Powell concurrence as
authority. In this ambiguous doctrinal context, it seems significant, as the
dissent argued, that the facts of Kellogg appear to match almost perfectly
White's hypothetical of the alcoholic without a home.'0 2 As the Kellogg
dissent pointed out, White seemed to imply that he would have voted with
the dissent-and hence changed the outcome of the case-had Powell, like
Kellogg, been both homeless and addicted to alcohol, and therefore unable
to avoid appearing intoxicated in public. 10 3  Nevertheless, the majority
rejected Kellogg's argument that punishing him for public intoxication
violated the Eighth Amendment. 04 In upholding Kellogg's conviction and
sentence, the court reasoned that Kellogg had been arrested, not merely for
being drunk in public, but for posing "a safety hazard" and by "blocking a
public way," thus satisfying Robinson's requirement that criminal
culpability be based on conduct, as opposed to mere status.'
0 5
In the same paragraph, however, the court appeared to find Kellogg
culpable merely for the potential danger posed by his status, rather than for
his actual conduct:
The facts of Kellogg's public intoxication in the instant case show a clear potential for
[] harm. He was found sitting in bushes on a freeway embankment in an inebriated
98 Id. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 Id. at 513 (majority opinion).
100 See id. 512-14; cf Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal.
1994) ("Plaintiffs' argument that Powell would have been differently decided had the
defendant been homeless does not reflect the holding of the case and is sheer speculation.
While language in Justice White's concurrence can be argued to support that contention,
such language was dicta.") (emphasis added).
'0 Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 554 n.5
(1968)) ("[White] acknowledged that the dictates of the defendant's and the public's safety
made it constitutional for 'a police officer to arrest any seriously intoxicated person whom he
[or she] encountered in a public place."').
102 Powell, 392 U.S. at 551.
"03 See id.; Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 527 (McDonald, J., dissenting).




state. It is not difficult to imagine the serious possibility of danger to himself or
others had he wandered off the embankment onto the freeway. 1
06
This analysis underscores the difficulty of distinguishing between
status and conduct. Was Kellogg's conduct simply appearing drunk in
public? Was it appearing drunk on a freeway embankment? Or was it
creating a "serious possibility of danger to himself or others"? In any
event, it is readily apparent that the distinction provided by the status/act
reading is far from a bright line. 0 7 Justice Marshall, in Powell, and Justice
White, dissenting in Robinson, expressed a similar concern with the
volitional reading.10 8  The Kellogg majority's application of the status/act
reading seems particularly unsound in light of the slippery slope arguments
of those who favor it.
It is worth noting that in one other respect, the Kellogg majority
misunderstood Robinson. Relying on precedent from the California
Supreme Court,'09 the court held that "[b]ased on the guidance provided by
Powell and Sundance, we conclude that the California Legislature's
decision to allow misdemeanor culpability for public intoxication, even as
applied to a homeless chronic alcoholic such as Kellogg, is neither
disproportionate to the offense nor inhumane."'"10 However, Robinson and
Powell did not apply a "proportionality principle" to punishing status.' As
106 Id. (emphasis added).
107 While no court has discussed the issue of linguistic manipulation in the context of an
Eighth Amendment claim raised by homeless litigants, a similar issue arises when homeless
persons raise void-for-vagueness arguments. For example, in a case decided four years after
Powell, the Supreme Court struck down a vagrancy ordinance on vagueness grounds, since
the language of the statute did not give fair notice of what conduct was prohibited, and
therefore encouraged arbitrary enforcement. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 162 (1972). More recently, however, several courts have dismissed vagueness
arguments raised by homeless litigants against camping ordinances (i.e., municipal laws that
ban the performance of life-sustaining activities-such as sleeping, eating, and urinating-in
public). See, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 863 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1167 (Cal. 1995). The formal similarity between
vagueness and status/act arguments in this context should not be overlooked: vague laws
allow arbitrary enforcement by police, while judges may uphold statutes that target status by
arbitrarily drawing lines between status and act.
108 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 534 ("Even if we limit our consideration to chronic
alcoholics, it would seem impossible to confine the principle within the arbitrary bounds
which the dissent seems to envision."); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 688 (1962)
(White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's opinion bristles with indications of further
consequences.").
109 Sundance v. Municipal Court, 729 P.2d 80 (Cal. 1986).
110 Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 514.
111 See supra Part II.A.
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Justice Stewart reasoned in Robinson, "[e]ven one day in prison would be a




B. JACKSON V. COMMONWEALTH: A STATUS BY ANY OTHER NAME
Another recent case underscores the difficulty of distinguishing
between status and conduct. 1 3 In Jackson, the defendant had been declared
a habitual drunk pursuant to a state statute that allowed local courts to enter
an "order of interdiction" against any person who "has shown himself to be
a habitual drunkard."' 14 Once a person has been interdicted he may be held
criminally liable for possessing alcoholic beverages, or being "drunk in
public."' 15
Since the interdiction order, Jackson "had received sentences ranging
from sixty days to seven months and had not remained out of jail for any
period longer than a month."' 16 He testified at his trial that "although he
knows that it is illegal for him to drink, he cannot stop drinking."
1 7
Nevertheless, the court rejected his argument that the Virginia law
outlawing the purchase of alcohol by interdicted people violated the Eighth
Amendment by punishing him for his addiction to alcohol. 18 The court
reasoned that the statute "imposes no criminal sanction for the status of
being an alcoholic [but rather] forbids specific behavior: possession of
alcohol and public drunkenness by interdicted persons. ' 19
The Jackson court's reasoning seems to adhere closely to the status/act
reading of Robinson and Powell. By purchasing alcohol, Jackson had
indeed committed an act, and as a strictly technical matter, he was being
punished for that act rather than for his status as an alcoholic. 20 If Jackson
had performed this act before being interdicted, however, it would not have
been a crime. Thus, under Virginia's statutory scheme, punishing Jackson's
status as an alcoholic adds one step to California's direct criminalization of
drug addiction in Robinson.'2 1 Once Jackson was interdicted for being an
alcoholic, his otherwise innocent conduct could be punished.
112 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
113 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 122 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
114 VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333 (2005).
"' Id. § 4.1-322.
116 Jackson, 604 S.E.2d at 124.
117 id.
"8 Id. at 125.
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661 (1962).
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Virginia's statutory scheme may represent a more attenuated way to
punish status than the law in Robinson. The result, however, is the same:
the law essentially waits for the addict to succumb to his addiction, at which
point he has committed a crime. Under that status/act reading, Robinson is
all but a dead letter.
As a textual matter, the Eighth Amendment is intended to prohibit the
state from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.122  As Justice White
noted in his Robinson dissent, it is difficult to discern how punishing status
directly (as did the law in Robinson) is any more cruel or unusual than
punishing status indirectly (as does the law in Jackson).123 If the California
statutory scheme at issue in Robinson allowed the state to interdict
prescription drug addicts and then to arrest interdicted addicts for filling
prescriptions, it is unlikely that the Robinson Court would have found the
scheme any less cruel and unusual than the direct criminalization of drug
addiction. Thus, the Jackson court could easily have ruled differently using
the same status/act principle it used to uphold Jackson's conviction.
IV. Is HOMELESSNESS A STATUS UNDER THE MEANING OF ROBiNSON?
The definition of conduct under the status/act reading of the Robinson
doctrine is far from clear. But what about the definition of a status? This
section discusses two cases involving homeless plaintiffs challenging
municipal ordinances proscribing certain public behavior. These cases both
apply status/act readings of Robinson and Powell, but reach opposite
results. In the first case, the court found that the notion of punishing status
must include the involuntary or life-sustaining acts that are derivative of
status membership, and that the camping ordinances at issue violated the
Eighth Amendment. 124  In the second case, the court read the laws in
question literally, and found that because they nominally punished conduct
and not status, they passed constitutional muster.' 25 Before applying these
status/act analyses, however, both Courts addressed the threshold question
122 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 688 (White, J., dissenting); see also Smith, supra note 4, at
312-13 (arguing that a status/act reading of Robinson and Powell would not prevent the state
from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, but rather would prevent the state from
violating the Due Process Clause by limiting the reach of the state's police power, allowing
the state only to punish conduct within its borders).
124 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("The harmless
conduct for which [plaintiffs] are arrested is inseparable from their involuntary condition of
being homeless.").
125 Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("On no
occasion.., has the Supreme Court invoked the Eighth Amendment in order to protect acts
derivative of a person's status.").
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of whether homelessness is a status, and attempted to formulate broader
definitions of status under the meaning of Robinson.'26 This question has
taken on new relevance in recent months, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
which left many residents of the Gulf Coast region homeless.
127
A. POTTINGER V. CITY OF MIAMI: A THREE-PART TEST FOR STATUS
In Pottinger v. City of Miami, a class of homeless plaintiffs requested
that Miami "be enjoined from arresting homeless individuals for inoffensive
conduct, such as sleeping or bathing, that they are forced to perform in
public.' 28 The court held that such arrests violated the Eighth Amendment,
and ordered the city to "establish two 'safe zones' where homeless people
who have no alternative shelter can remain without being arrested for
harmless conduct such as sleeping or eating."'
' 29
The Pottinger court's conclusion that arresting homeless persons for
involuntary, life-sustaining activities conduct violated the Eighth
Amendment turned on three significant findings of fact that collectively
formed what one scholar has termed a "three part test" for determining
whether homelessness is a status.1 30  The test is contextual: whether
homelessness is a status depends on factual determinations in a given
case. 131
The first part of the test is whether homelessness is voluntary or
involuntary. 3 2 At trial, the plaintiffs' witness James Wright, "an expert in
the sociology of the homeless," testified that "homeless individuals rarely,
if ever, choose to be homeless."' 133 Thus, the first part of the test would
seem to be satisfied in most situations.
The second part of the test is whether the municipality has adequate
shelter space to house its homeless population.' 34 In Pottinger, because of
limited shelter space in the city of Miami-which was exacerbated by a
126 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1563-65; Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857-58.
127 See Sid L. Mohn, From Extreme Crisis Comes Clarity, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 2005, at
Cl:
Hundreds of thousands of hurricane victims are now dispersed throughout the country, many of
them jobless, homeless, physically injured or emotionally traumatized. Unless our public
support systems for the poor and the disadvantaged are bolstered in the face of this turmoil, there
is a danger this temporary hardship could devolve into a permanent cycle of poverty.
12 810 F. Supp. at 1554.
129 Id. at 1584.
130 Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 43.
131 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564-65.
132 Id. at 1557.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1558.
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recent natural disaster-"the majority of homeless individuals [in the city]
literally have no place to go.'
' 35
The third part of the test is whether the city has set aside spaces where
the homeless may legally perform life-sustaining activities in public. 36 In
Pottinger, the court found that in Miami, "there is no public place where
[the homeless] can perform basic, essential acts such as sleeping without
the possibility of being arrested."1 37 If the three elements of the test are
satisfied, the court implied, homelessness should be considered a status.
138
Under the alternative readings of Robinson and Powell discussed
above, 39 these findings of fact could potentially yield two opposite
outcomes. A status/act reading would lead to a conclusion that sleeping and
eating in public are conduct, and therefore, it is within the state's police
power to arrest people for performing these acts. However, under a
volitional reading, because homeless persons have no choice but to perform
these public activities, the laws as applied to them are unconstitutional.
The Pottinger court recognized the difficulty of the former reading,
and, like the dissenting opinion in Kellogg,140 looked to Justice White's
concurring opinion in Powell as authoritative:
To paraphrase Justice White, plaintiffs have no place else to go and no place else to
be. This is sd particularly at night when the public parks are closed. As long as the
homeless plaintiffs do not have a single place where they can lawfully be, the
challenged ordinances, as applied to them, effectively punish them for something for
which they may not be convicted under the eighth amendment-sleeping, eating and
other innocent conduct.
14 1
The underpinnings of this decision, as mentioned above, are threefold,
and it is worthwhile to consider each part of the test individually.
42
1. The First Part of the Pottinger Test
The first part-that homeless persons "rarely, if ever, choose to be
homeless"143 -is the most controversial. There is a consensus among social
scientists, who have identified a variety of economic and social factors
beyond a person's control that may lead an individual to become
' Id. at 1559.
136 Id. at 1560.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1565.
39 See supra Part II.C.
140 See supra Part III.A.
4' 810 F. Supp. at 1565 (citation omitted).
142 Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 43.
43 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1557.
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homeless,144 but there is a significant public perception that homelessness is
the result of personal moral failure, or even of a choice of lifestyle. 145
There is also a public perception that homeless people are a particularly
dangerous or deviant segment of the population:
There is "a strong tendency for the public to link homelessness to deviant status." A
majority (53.5%) of people surveyed in 1990 agreed with at least one of the following
statements: homeless people are "more dangerous than other people," are "more likely
to commit violent crimes than other people," or "should be kept from congregating in
public places in the interest of public safety." . . . Large percentages of opinion poll
respondents have favored "criminalization" solutions [to the homeless problem],
including ... prohibitions on panhandling (69.9%), setting up temporary shelter in
public parks (69.1%) and sleeping overnight in public places (50.8%). 146
At times, conflicting images of the homeless-as on the one hand,
dangerous and morally culpable, and on the other, helpless--overlap. As
one journalist observed, the most common attitude toward the homeless
might simply be ambivalence.147 This ambivalence is exacerbated when
oe considers that some homeless persons choose not to live in shelters,
48
while others (including Thomas Kellogg) actively refuse social services
offered to them. 149 One might see these refusals of assistance as indicators
that homelessness is a free choice. However, a determination of
homelessness as voluntary or involuntary arguably should not turn on the
individual decisions of homeless persons to seek or avoid shelter:
For most homeless people, there are significant elements of both agency and
compulsion in the decisions they make. It may be that for many, homelessness is at
some level "voluntary." But the range of choices available to homeless individuals
may be so narrow and so unsatisfying that a condition many of us cannot imagine
being freely chosen is indeed the least of all possible evils.
1 50
144 Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 8-12.
14 See, e.g., Debra J. Saunders, Whither the Special City?, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 2003, at
D4.
146 Daniels, supra note 7, at 720-21 (citing a 1990 survey entitled "Public Attitudes and
Beliefs about Homeless People").
147 Saunders, supra note 145.
148 See, e.g., Corey Kilgannon, At Home Under Highway, Even as Rats Flee, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 23, 2003, at B1.
149 See People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Saunders,
supra note 145.
150 Daniels, supra note 7, at 716.
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2. The Second Part of the Pottinger Test
The second part of the Pottinger test for whether homelessness is a
status-that the homeless have "no place to go"151-is intimately related to
the first part, that homelessness is not a matter of choice. 152 As one federal
district court noted:
There are not enough beds available at the area shelters to accommodate the demand.
Some persons do not meet a particular shelter's eligibility requirements. For many of
those homeless in Dallas, the unavailability of shelter is not a function of choice; it is
not an issue of choosing to remain outdoors rather than sleep on a shelter's floor
because the shelter could not provide a bed that one found suitable enough.
5 3
What distinguishes the second element from the first is that whether a
homeless person has a place to go will vary depending on what city he lives
in, and on whether the city has any available shelter space. 154  Courts
upholding anti-sleeping laws simply do not address the simple arithmetic of
this element. 55 However, courts striking down camping ordinances invoke
the housing shortages in the cities enacting the ordinances:
The lack of low-income housing or shelter space cannot be underestimated as a factor
contributing to homelessness. At the time of trial, Miami had fewer than 700 beds
available in shelters for the homeless. Except for a fortunate few, most homeless
individuals have no alternative to living in public areas.156
151 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
152 Id. at 1557.
153 Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 61 F.3d
442 (5th Cir. 1995).
154 See, e.g., Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 40.
155 See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1166-67 (Cal. 1995) (no mention
of the number of shelter beds available in section of opinion concerning "Punishment for
Status"). The opinion in Tobe omitted the lower court's factual finding that "[tihe housing
element of the city's own 1989 general plan noted, 'The average daily count of homeless
persons in Santa Ana is estimated at approximately 3,000 persons.' There was shelter for
but 332 of them." Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 387 (Cal. App. Ct.
1994); see also Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In Joyce,
the Court did not dispute plaintiffs' contention "that from January to July of 1993, an
average of 500 homeless persons was turned away nightly from homeless shelters." Id. at
849. Nevertheless, the Court refused to define homelessness as a status, reasoning that
"homelessness does not analytically fit into a definition of a status under the contours of
governing case law [and] the effects which would ensue from [a determination of status]
would be staggering. Id. at 858; see infra Part IV.B.
156 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1558; see also Johnson, 860 F. Supp at 350; Church v. City
of Huntsville, Civ. A. No. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401, at *2 (N.D. Ala. 1993), vacated,
30 F.3d 1332 (1 1th Cir. 1994) ("There is insufficient public housing in Huntsville. As of
May 1991, between 400 and 600 families were on the waiting list for public housing in
Huntsville. As of that date, there were an estimated 120 homeless persons living on the
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3. The Third Part of the Pottinger Test
The third part of the Pottinger test is the culmination of the first two:
Because homelessness is not a choice, and because the homeless litigant
finds himself living in a city with inadequate shelter space, he has no choice
but to break the law because "there is no public place where [he] can
perform basic, essential acts such as sleeping without the possibility of
being arrested."
' 157
This part forms the crux of the dispute between advocates for the
homeless and those who feel that city governments are entitled to use their
police power to keep cities attractive, safe, and clean.' 58 The homeless and
their advocates view "camping ordinances" as part of a campaign "to drive
homeless residents from the city."' 5 9 One federal district court, in granting
homeless plaintiffs' request for an injunction against a city's use of such a
campaign, described some of the tactics that the municipality had used in an
apparent effort to remove the homeless population from its streets:
It is the unannounced, but nonetheless official, policy of the City of Huntsville to
isolate homeless citizens from the established residential areas of the city and
ultimately, in the words of Councilman King, ".... to show these folks where the city
limits are .... " i.e., to remove this class of citizens from Huntsville.... The City of
Huntsville uses its inspection department and zoning laws in an uneven manner to
discourage the establishment and continued operation of homeless shelters in
residential areas of the city .... The City of Huntsville uses its police department to
facilitate and promote its policy of isolating and removing its homeless citizens from
the city. Homeless citizens have been regularly harassed in parks and other public
places by Huntsville policemen over a period of time simply because of their status as
homeless citizens. On occasion, class members have been detained by Huntsville
policemen, taken beyond the city limits of the City of Huntsville, and then
abandoned-in literal pursuit of the city's official policy. The homeless are at times
harassed by policemen for simply walking or congregating in certain sections of the
City of Huntsville. They have been ordered out of city parks by city emplo 'ees and
told not to return, even though they were not violating any laws at the time.
The Church court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction against such practices. However, the court did not cite "any
specific constitutional provision or case precedent [in holding] that the city
streets of Huntsville. There is no credible evidence of any improvement in these matters
during the last two years.").
' Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1560.
158 See Maya Nordberg, Jails Not Homes: Quality of Life on the Streets of San Francisco,
13 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 261, 297 (2002).
159 McConkey, supra note 7, at 633.
160 Church, 1993 WL 646401, at *2.
161 Id. at *3.
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had a constitutional duty not to discriminate against the homeless."' 162
Perhaps as a result of this oversight, the decision was vacated by the
Eleventh Circuit.163 In vacating the decision, the Eleventh Circuit cited a
videotape of a City Council meeting in Hunstsville that depicted "a number
of homeowners complain[ing] about some real problems resulting from a
violation of City ordinances and building codes by and on behalf of the
homeless ... and angrily demand[ing] that the homeless be removed from
their neighborhoods immediately, regardless of the procedural mandates of
state or municipal law."' 64
The circuit court noted that the videotape went on to show two of
Huntsville's five City Council members "explaining to their constituents the
legal limitations on municipal action, including the need to respect the
rights of the homeless." 
1 65
Notwithstanding the laudable responses of these Council members to
their constituents' complaints, the court's description of the Hunstville City
Council meeting is illuminating, for it illustrates at least one opinion that
the public holds of homeless persons, and is indicative of the sort of
political pressure put on local lawmakers to remove the homeless from their
communities. 166 As one scholar has observed, these public opinions often
lead to legislative policies that marginalize the homeless: "The change in
the public's attitude [from sympathy to intolerance] has been reflected in
the policies of local governments. A growing number of city
administrations have established policies and laws that now make life more
difficult, and at times impossible, for the homeless.'
67
162 Daniels, supra note 7, at 709.
163 Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
164 Id. at 1343-44.
165 Id. at 1344.
166 The National Coalition for the Homeless, a Washington, D.C. advocacy group,
recently published a thorough report of municipal policies that target the innocent behavior
of homeless persons. See NAT'L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, ILLEGAL TO BE HOMELESS:
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA (2004), available at
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/crimreport/report.pdf [hereinafter N.C.H. REPORT]. The
N.C.H. Report notes that local governments receive pressure and coercion to criminalize
innocent conduct of the homeless from local business owners as well as national lobbying
organizations:
Private property owners are often able to persuade city officials to limit the use of public space
and establish Business Improvement Districts, or BIDs. These areas exclude people with no
access to private property from public property. [Two conservative think tanks']
recommendations for regulating public space limits the use of common property and seeks to
justify exclusion by calling homeless people criminals and threats to public safety.
Id. at 5-6.
167 Smith, supra note 4, at 299.
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The Pottinger court addressed this seemingly insoluble problem in a
novel way: it ordered the parties to
establish two "safe zones" where homeless people who have no alternative shelter can
remain without being arrested for harmless conduct such as sleeping or eating. In
establishing these arrest-free zones, counsel should consider the proximity of the areas
to feeding programs, health clinics and other services. In addition, the parties are
encouraged to develop a procedure for maintaining the areas.
6 8
B. JOYCE V. SAN FRANCISCO
In contrast to Pottinger, a federal district court in California refused to
grant a preliminary injunction against the city of San Francisco's "Matrix
Program," which, by the City's account, was designed
to address citizen complaints about a broad range of offenses occurring on the streets
and in parks and neighborhoods . . . including public drinking and inebriation,
obstruction of sidewalks, lodging, camping or sleeping in public parks, littering,
public urination and defecation, aggressive panhandling, dumping of refuse, graffiti,
vandalism, street prostitution, and street sales of narcotics, among others.
16 9
The plaintiffs-a class of homeless persons challenging the Matrix
Program-raised an Eighth Amendment argument similar to the one raised
by Thomas Kellogg: in the case of homeless litigants, Justice White's
concurring opinion in Powell should be read as controlling. 70
Applying a status/act reading, the Joyce court found, as a preliminary
matter, that the Matrix Program, unlike the statute punishing drug addiction
in Robinson, "targets the commission of discrete acts of conduct, not a
person's appearance as a vagrant vel non."17' Because it was considering
whether to grant a preliminary injunction-and therefore whether the
plaintiffs could demonstrate "a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of the underlying suit"1 7 2-the court addressed whether
homelessness was a status.173
The court made three efforts to avoid classifying homelessness as a
status. 174 First, it explicitly rejected the argument in Pottinger that the lack
of available shelter beds in a city should be a factor in determining whether
168 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
169 Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
170 Id. at 855.
171 id.
172 Id. at 856.




homelessness is a status, 17 5 stating that "status cannot be defined as a
function of the discretionary acts of others."'176 Therefore, homelessness is
not a status because "the housing provided to the homeless is a matter for
the discretion of the City and State."
'177
This first attempt to define status in a manner that would exclude
homelessness relies on the principle, expressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court,178 that a state is not constitutionally required to provide housing for
its residents. 179 From the perspective of Robinson, however, this principle
seems irrelevant. For Eighth Amendment purposes, status membership-as
evidenced by the drug-addicted defendant in Robinson-is not related to
one's status in other constitutional contexts.
The Joyce court's second effort to exclude homelessness from status
differentiated status from mere "condition" by explaining that "[w]hile the
concept of status might elude perfect definition, certain factors assist in its
determination, such as the involuntariness of the acquisition of that quality
(including the presence or not of that characteristic at birth), and the degree
to which an individual has control over that characteristic.,,180 Like some
drug addicts, some homeless people are born homeless, and they therefore
acquire their homelessness involuntarily and have no control over whether
they have a home. 81 Indeed, "it may also be argued that usually there is a
lesser degree of 'choice' or voluntariness involved in becoming homeless
than in becoming a drug addict." 182 More importantly, the Court's
definition of status in Robinson did not turn on whether the defendant had
become a drug addict voluntarily or involuntarily.1
83
The Joyce court derived its distinction between status and condition
from Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Powell.184 This reference to
Powell is misleading. Marshall's distinction was between the status of
175 Id at 857; see also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. Fla.
1992).
176 Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857.
171 Id. at 857 n.9 (citations omitted).
178 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("The Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill .... Absent constitutional mandate, the
assurance of adequate housing [is a legislative function].").
179 See Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857 n.9 (citing Lindsey).
'8' Id. at 857.
181 See, e.g., Laurie Monsebraaten & Jim Rankin, Losing a Home for the Homeless,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 3, 2003, at B4.
182 McConkey, supra note 7, at 642.
183 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662 (1962). The defendant simply denied that
he had used or was addicted to narcotics, and the jury apparently did not believe him. Id.
184 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
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chronic alcoholism and the condition of intoxication.185 The dissent in
Powell argued that Leroy Powell's condition of being drunk was "a
characteristic part of the pattern of his disease and which, the trial court
found, was not the consequence of appellant's volition."' 86 Considering the
Powell Court's understanding of "condition," categorizing homelessness as
a condition is not helpful.
The Joyce court's third effort to exclude homelessness from status
involves the notion that homelessness may be more easily or quickly
remedied than drug addiction.187 As the court stated, "while homelessness
can be thrust upon an unwitting [sic] recipient, and while a person may be
largely incapable of changing that condition, the distinction between the
ability to eliminate one's drug addiction as compared to one's homelessness
is a distinction in kind as much as in degree."' 88 The court did not elaborate
on what, exactly, the distinction is, but one scholar has speculated that the
court "seems to have found significance in the fact that, while a homeless
person immediately loses her 'status' when provided with housing, a drug
addict's road to recovery is less assured.', 189 However, the court "appears to
have ignored previous scholarly and judicial discourse on the rationales
underlying the Robinson doctrine. The relevant inquiry regarding changing
a status is not how quickly a status can be changed but whether leaving the
status is within the defendant's power."'
' 90
The simplest inquiry into whether a homeless person has the power not
to be homeless is the second part in the Pottinger test, viz., whether the city
has adequate shelter space. 191 However, the Joyce court rejected this
inquiry when it concluded, contrary to Robinson, that "status cannot be
defined as a function of the discretionary acts of others."'
' 92
The Joyce court's convoluted definition of status underscores the
nagging difficulty at the heart of the Robinson doctrine. More disturbing
than the logical holes in Joyce's argument for a definition of status,
however, is the premise of that argument. If homelessness is not a status,
then, according to Joyce, it would not violate the Eighth Amendment to
punish a person for the "crime" of being homeless. Of course, the Supreme
Court has declared vagrancy statutes unconstitutional on Due Process
185 Id.
186 Id. at 558 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
187 Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
188 Id.
189 Smith, supra note 4, at 327.
190 Id. at 327-28.
191 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
192 Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857.
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grounds.193 Simply because a law punishing the status of vagrancy has been
struck down on vagueness grounds, however, does not mean that the law
would pass muster under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, it seems that what
is left of Joyce's position is its initial premise for denying the injunction
against the challenged sections of the Matrix Program: that these laws
"target[] discrete acts of conduct., 194
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE ROBINSON DOCTRINE TO
CAMPING ORDINANCES
Whether courts apply a status/act or a volitional reading of Robinson
and Powell, they ought to recognize the policies behind laws targeting
innocent conduct. The two primary policy rationales for camping
ordinances-which punish sleeping, eating and other victimless activities
when performed in public-are fairly intuitive, although one is considered
by many to be legitimate, while the other remains unspoken.
The first rationale includes camping ordinances in a crime-reduction
scheme that has come to be known as "quality-of-life enforcement,"', 95 and
which is designed to create "increased police-citizen contact as a way to
create and maintain order in our urban streets and to decrease serious
crime. ' 96 Proponents of this scheme-which is also known as the "order-
maintenance approach" or the "Broken Windows" theory' 97 -
"affirmatively promote youth curfews, anti-gang loitering ordinances, and
order-maintenance crackdowns as milder alternatives to the theory of
incapacitation and increased incarceration., 198  The premise underlying
these quality-of-life measures is that cracking down on minor offenses will
create an appearance of order in public spaces, which will deter "serious
criminal activity."'
' 99
193 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Papachristou struck
down a municipal ordinance making it a criminal offense to be a vagrant on vagueness
grounds. Id. at 171; see supra text accompanying note 68. Joyce rejected the plaintiffs'
vagueness argument on the ground that the Matrix Program is not "impermissibly vague in
all of its applications." 846 F. Supp. at 862.
"' Id, at 855.
195 Nordberg, supra note 158, at 276.
196 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 2 (2001).
197 "Broken Windows" is the title of an influential 1982 article by the sociologists James
Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
198 HARCOURT, supra note 196, at 5.
'99 Id. at 2-3.
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The second, more hidden, rationale for camping ordinances is that, by
allowing the police to harass the homeless through "removal or targeted
arrest campaigns" to the point where the homeless can no longer live in a
given city, elected officials appear to be "doing something" about the
homeless problem in their cities.2 °° In other words, camping ordinances,
particularly when they become part of a police campaign, eliminate
homeless people from the view of the populace by making it illegal for the
homeless to live in the city.20 1 This rationale is cosmetic 202-unlike the
quality-of-life rationale, it does not target the homeless by way of
nominally deterring serious crimes.203 A policy of cosmetic removal leads
to one of two outcomes. The first is a "domino effect": if the homeless
cannot live in one city, they are simply forced to move to a more tolerant
city. 204  The second is a costly cycle of "arrest, prosecution, and court
enforced-service planning. 20 5
The second outcome played out in the San Diego Police Department's
206treatment of Thomas Kellogg. In addition to raising constitutional
questions, Kellogg's case is indicative of why a pure status/act reading of
Robinson and Powell, under which camping ordinances are upheld because
they nominally punish conduct, lead to unfavorable outcomes from a public
200 Nordberg, supra note 158, at 275-76.
201 See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citing
a Santa Ana municipal memo stating that "[a] task force has been formed in an effort to deal
with the vagrants. City Council has developed a policy that the vagrants are no longer
welcome in the City of Santa Ana.").
202 See N.C.H. REPORT, supra note 166, at 16. The report discusses the increased
attention that Little Rock, Arkansas law enforcement officials paid to the homeless
population of that city just prior to the opening of the Clinton Presidential Center in
November of 2004. Id. The report notes as well that when the Mayor of Little Rock "was
asked whether the sweeps [of homeless populations around this time] had anything to do
with tourism, he said, 'Absolutely."' Id. The report found that when it came to mistreating
its homeless population, Little Rock was the "meanest city in America." Id. at 16-18.
Atlanta, Cincinnati, Las Vegas, Gainesville, New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Honolulu, and Austin, TX, rounded out the top ten, in that order. Id. at 18-29.
203 See HARCOURT, supra note 196, at 2-3.
204 McConkey, supra note 7, at 667 ("[W]here there is a domino effect of neighboring
communities adopting similar ordinances, the game of musical chairs may take the form of
homeless populations being cycled from one community to another.").
205 Nordberg, supra note 158, at 298.
206 People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 508-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see supra Part
III.A. As of 2004, there were "2,019 shelter beds and 4,458 homeless people" in San Diego,
where Thomas Kellogg was arrested for public intoxication. N.C.H. REPORT, supra note
166, at 67. The report cites a homeless advocate, who notes that, due to police crackdowns,
"homeless people are sleeping in more remote areas [of the city] to avoid tickets." Id.




policy standpoint. 0 7 Somewhat paradoxically, the policy implications of
applying the status/act reading to homeless persons are most evident in
Justice Haller's majority opinion when she is expressing her own sympathy
for Kellogg, and describing the compassion of Kellogg's jailers and
arresting officers.2 °8
Judging from the facts in the opinion, the police who arrested Kellogg,
and his jailers, were apparently kind to him.2 °9 Moreover, this kindness
seems to be the result of official police procedures: the officer who arrested
Kellogg for the first time, Heidi Hawley, is "a member of the [city's]
Homeless Outreach Team," which "consists of police officers, social
services technicians, and psychiatric technicians," which, on prior occasions
had approached Kellogg to offer him assistance, and which once before had
taken Kellogg to the hospital for medical care.210 In jail, Kellogg received a
variety of medical attention, including assistance for alcohol withdrawal. 21
At trial, a physician testifying for the prosecution testified that Kellogg's
condition improved in jail.212
While the compassionate police treatment of Kellogg is heartening, it
suggests a gap between the state of the law of public intoxication as applied
to homeless alcoholics and public policy considerations.2 3 In short, the law
allows the homeless to be arrested, and then obliges the police to care for
them.214 However, as Kellogg contended, because he was a "chronic" or
"serial" alcoholic, he was apparently ineligible for "the option of civil
detoxification. 2 1 5 The facts of Kellogg's case are not only suggestive of
the cruel reality that people like Thomas Kellogg are perpetually exposed to
criminal liability; they also attest to the futility of applying camping
ordinances compassionately.
216
207 See N.C.H. REPORT, supra note 166, at 6. ("The legal challenges resulting from
criminalizing homelessness have proven costly for both homeless people and for those who
prosecute them.").
218 Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 515 ("We are sympathetic to Kellogg's plight .....
Indeed, Justice Haller's sympathy is indicative of the dilemma that criminalizing
homelessness has caused for the criminal justice system, including law enforcement officers.
As one homeless advocate has noted, "The police are not bad guys. They're being put in the
middle of a very serious social problem." N.C.H. REPORT, supra note 166, at 68.
209 Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 508-11.
210 Id. at 508-09, 508 n.2.




215 Id. at 516 n.9.
216 According to a report prepared by one homeless advocacy group:
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Meanwhile, as one scholar has suggested, abandoning a regime of
camping ordinances not only will oblige cities to "[d]eliver[]
comprehensive services to homeless people," but will lead to "more
effective and cheaper" means for cities to address the homeless problem.
2 17
At any rate, courts should not remain complicit in legislative efforts to keep
homeless people out of sight of the voting public. Simply put, courts
should not hide behind slavish status/act readings of the Robinson doctrine
to enable legislators to appease their constituents. Not only is such an
application of the Robinson doctrine a distortion of the principle underlying
Robinson v. California, it leads to cosmetic and ineffectual methods of
dealing with a widespread and substantial social problem and allows cities
to "pass the buck" to cities making good-faith efforts to solve the homeless
problem. 18
VI. THE BEHAVIORAL/CONTEXTUAL READING: A NEW, FAIRER PRINCIPLE
FOR APPLYING THE ROBINSON DOCTRINE
How, then, can courts strike down camping ordinances and other laws
that for all practical purposes punish status, without neutering
municipalities' police power? The answer may well lie in the Robinson
doctrine.
Even many of those who reject a volitional reading of the Robinson
doctrine still recognize intuitively that there is something wrong with
branding someone a criminal for doing something that it is beyond their
power to avoid doing.219 On the other hand, courts have found it difficult to
assert a limiting principle that would prevent lawmakers from targeting
innocent conduct like sleeping in public, while allowing them to punish
truly culpable--or at least harmful--conduct, such as buying or using
drugs. 22
0
It is more expensive to detain a person in jail than to house and offer services. According to the
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2003 report, Punishing Poverty: The
Criminalization of Homelessness, Litigation, and Recommendations for Solutions, the cost of
providing jail, excluding the cost of the police resources used in the arrest, exceeds $40 per day.
Some say the daily cost is as much as $140. In comparison, the average cost of providing
counseling, housing, food, and transportation for one day is approximately $30.
N.C.H. REPORT, supra note 166, at 6-7.
217 Nordberg, supra note 158, at 299; see also N.C.H. REPORT, supra note 166, at 6-7.
218 See id. at 6-8.
2t9 For instance, Justice Clark, dissenting in Robinson, recognizes that the state should
(and, in the case of California, did) provide for civil commitment for "addicts who have lost
the power of self-control." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 681 (1962) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
220 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534 (1968).
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To date, proponents of the volitional reading have adopted or
attempted to formulate tests that rely on overly subjective or factually
burdensome standards of analysis. One scholar, for instance, has suggested
a test for applying the Robinson doctrine to "symptomatic acts":
If the case involves symptomatic acts [derived from status], then a test should be
applied based on the homelessness paradigm. The following would have to be
established for the Robinson doctrine to apply to symptomatic acts: (a) the "act"
would have to be involuntary, (b) the status would have to be one that "cannot be
changed" through individual volition except with significant outside assistance and (c)
the "act" would have to be inextricably related to the status such that, as with the
homelessness case, criminalization of the act obviously criminalized the status.
2 2 1
Unfortunately, this test-while it will result in a finding that camping
ordinances are unconstitutional-leaves open to manipulation the definition
of such terms as "involuntary,, 222 "cannot be changed," "inextricably," and
"obviously," and remains vulnerable to Justice Marshall's slippery slope
argument in Powell.
223
The court in Pottinger devised a more objective test, but one that
would require defendants employing Robinson defenses to obtain factual
information that may be difficult to obtain, and at any rate may not
convince an unsympathetic court that their conduct was unavoidable.
2 24
The Pottinger test essentially requires a homeless litigant to prove that the
number of homeless persons living in the city on the night when he or she
was arrested exceeded the number of available shelter beds.225 That proof
would be difficult for a homeless litigant to establish, not least because
calculating homeless populations usually involves a degree of estimation
that courts may simply reject on evidentiary grounds.22 6
The tests described above are derived from volitional readings of the
Robinson doctrine, and thus are likely to be rejected by any court attracted
to the seemingly bright-line status/act reading.227 However, these strict
status/act readings-which claim legitimacy based on the purportedly self-
evident difference between a status and an act-are equally susceptible to
221 Smith, supra note 4, at 334.
222 See Daniels, supra note 7, at 715 ("Advocates should consider abandoning the
argument that the behavior of homeless people is 'involuntary'....").
223 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 534 ("[I]t is difficult to see how a State can convict an
individual for murder, if that individual... suffers from a 'compulsion' to kill ... ").
224 For a discussion of the three-part Pottinger test, see supra Part III.A. For a discussion
of one court's effective dismantling of the test, see supra Part II.B.
225 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
226 See Smith, supra note 4, at 297 n.24.
227 See, e.g., People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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uncertainty.22s Furthermore, these readings strip the Robinson doctrine of
its fundamental substance, that the criminal law should strive, to the extent
possible, to punish only the culpable.229
The Robinson and Powell Courts clearly did not contemplate the
homeless epidemic that would arise in the 1980s, and that may be severely
exacerbated by Hurricane Katrina. However, given the "evolving standards
of decency" rationale of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence-
and invoked by Justices Stewart and Douglas in Robinson230 -one can
argue that the Robinson majority would not have tolerated a law making it a
crime simply to be without a home. Similarly, it is likely that the Robinson
Court would have frowned upon criminalization of the innocent acts of
homeless persons. Thus, to reduce the Robinson doctrine to a strict
status/act reading-in addition to creating a false and easily malleable
dichotomy between status and act23 '-is also a clear undermining of
Robinson's holding, which, although difficult to articulate, remains good
law.
Courts could solve the dilemma of how to articulate the Robinson
doctrine-while not edging down the slippery slope as Justice Marshall
232
and others233 have feared-simply enough by distinguishing between
innocent and culpable conduct. The test for determining whether conduct is
innocent or culpable would be this: is the targeted conduct only unlawful in
a particular context? If so, then the conduct is innocent, and if the
defendant is unable either to escape the context, or avoid performing the
conduct, 234 it would violate the Eighth Amendment to hold him criminally
liable.235
228 See supra Part IV.B.
229 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); see
also State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 933 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (internal
quotations omitted) ("The conception of blameworthiness or moral guilt is necessarily based
upon a free mind voluntarily choosing evil rather than good; there can be no criminality in
the sense of moral shortcoming if there is no freedom of choice or normality of will capable
of exercising a free choice." (quoting Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV.
974, 1004)).
230 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-68.
231 See supra Parts III.A-B.
232 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534 (1968).
233 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 81, at 434-35.
234 This test is referred to as a "contextual reading" of the Robinson doctrine.
235 As a procedural matter, this two-part test could serve as the elements of a
constitutional affirmative defense, under which the defendant would have the burden of
proving that the conduct he is being punished for is innocent and that, because of who he is,
he cannot escape the context in which the conduct becomes unlawful. The factual
framework established by the Pottinger court may provide some guidance as to how a
defendant could mount such a defense. See supra Parts IV.A. 1-3.
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To understand this contextual reading, one must draw a distinction
between laws that criminalize specific conduct in all spacial and temporal
contexts-such as theft, homicide, rape, assault, and buying or possessing
drugs-and laws that criminalize conduct only when performed in certain
contexts, that is, in certain times and places, or under certain circumstances.
The latter category includes the various forms of disturbing the peace and
public indecency. Because very few people, if any, are unable to refrain
from disturbing the peace, a defendant invoking a contextual reading of the
Robinson doctrine as a defense to one of these charges would be
unsuccessful.
On the other hand, a homeless litigant charged with sleeping in
public-a contextual crime-can argue that he does not have a home and
had nowhere else to sleep. Under a status/act reading of the Robinson
doctrine, the argument would fail, because sleeping is an act. Under a
volitional reading, his argument is correct, but, as Justice Marshall argued,
so would be the argument of a person charged with homicide who "suffers
from a compulsion to kill. 236 No homicide defendant could employ the
contextual reading as a defense, since his conduct is culpable regardless of
the context in which he has committed it.
There are several acts, of course, whose culpability is a function of the
context in which they are performed-and a contextual reading of the
Robinson doctrine accommodates criminalization of these acts. For
instance, a person who has a valid driver's license, but whose blood alcohol
level is above the legal limit, is prohibited from driving. His conduct
(driving) is unlawful only in a certain context (when he is intoxicated).
Unless he is an alcoholic, a driver can avoid becoming drunk, and therefore
he is liable for driving drunk. Even if the drunk driver is an alcoholic, he is
not compelled to drive.23 7
The contextual reading of the Robinson doctrine has three benefits.
First, it would quell the fears of adherents of the status/act reading, who
warn that if the volitional reading is adopted, the State would lose the
236 Powell, 392 U.S. at 534.
237 Of course, a class of laws-sometimes known as "quasi-criminal" laws-has come to
be accepted as a legitimate exercise of state power to regulate morally neutral aspects of
public welfare. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
703, 708 (2005). This class-which includes strict liability or "malum prohibitum" offenses
lacking a mens rea element and carrying light penalties-should perhaps be excepted from
the contextual reading of the Robinson doctrine advocated by this comment, because they
often involve innocent conduct that can't be avoided by the offender. However, this
exception is acceptable given the minimal stigma attached to these offenses. See Catherine
L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53
AM. U. L. REv. 313, 319 (2003).
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ability to punish even the compulsive killer for his act of homicide.238 In all
jurisdictions in the United States, homicide is a crime whenever and
wherever (within the jurisdiction) it is committed.239  Thus, under a
contextual reading, punishing homicide would not violate the Eighth
Amendment.
The second benefit of the contextual reading is that it would avoid
arbitrary distinctions between status and act,240 because status is not the
focal point of the analysis. As we have seen, judicial discussions of
whether homelessness is a status under the meaning of Robinson lead to
contrary conclusions.241 Such analyses, whatever their conclusions, neglect
to mention that under the "evolving standards of decency" principle
invoked by Robinson,242 the question of whether or not homelessness is a
status is irrelevant: no state in 2006 would pass a law making it illegal
simply to be without a home.243
Similarly, such an analysis would allow judges to avoid making ad hoc
determinations of what defines conduct.244 Some courts put life-sustaining
activity on the status side of the status/act divide,245 while others adhere to
the principle that any action that can be described by a verb (unless,
apparently, that verb is "to be") is conduct.246 A person's culpability should
not come down to such linguistic niceties. Under the contextual reading the
determination of culpability is made objectively, by reference to the state's
penal code: if the conduct is criminalized by the state in all contexts, it is
culpable.
The third benefit of the contextual reading is that it would continue to
allow legislatures to ameliorate social ills through the criminal law, for
example by creating "safe zones" for the homeless.247 Under such a
scheme, the legislature could target socially undesirable conduct because
the homeless would be able to avoid liability by moving to a designated
safe zone. Under a contextual reading of the Robinson doctrine, a homeless
238 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 534.
239 See id. at 559 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
240 See supra Parts III.A-B, IV.B.
241 See supra Part IV.
242 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67, 668 (1962).
243 Not least because Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville struck down vagrancy laws on
vagueness grounds over thirty years ago. See supra note 107.
244 See supra Parts III.A-B.
245 See supra Part IV.A.
246 See supra Part IV.B.
247 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (enjoining




person arrested for sleeping outside of the safe zone would not be able to
mount a successful Robinson defense.
Although such a solution may seem distasteful-it effectively
"quarantines" the homeless in designated areas-it is at least preferable to
"quarantining" the homeless in jails and subjecting them to criminal
liability. The scheme would also be fiscally beneficial to municipalities
that lack adequate funding for social services. Moreover, delivering social
services to the homeless may prove far simpler in a safe-zone city than in a
city whose homeless population is widely dispersed. Finally, as sociologist
Jane Jacobs described, whether by design or not, cities by their very nature
tend to breed areas in which "unwelcome users" congregate, but which are
not officially arrest-free zones.248
However difficult it has been to encapsulate in a rule, Robinson's
holding was designed to prevent branding people as criminals because of
who they are (as opposed to what they do), and distinguishing between
status and conduct has not furthered this goal. Because the Robinson
doctrine has been controversial and subject to differing interpretations,
those who favor the doctrine's continuing utility would be well-served by
an expression of the doctrine that is maximally neutral, rigid, and objective.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to show that there is an alternative to the
volitional reading and the status/act reading of the Robinson doctrine.
These two readings of the doctrine create the opposite dangers of allowing
the state to punish non-culpable conduct in a manner inconsistent with the
spirit of the doctrine, and limiting the state's police power by eroding its
ability to punish culpable conduct.
As the forty years of post-Robinson jurisprudence have demonstrated,
however, a status/act reading of the Robinson doctrine can yield egregious
results, including the conviction of homeless persons for the "crimes" of
sleeping and eating, 249 and the conviction of alcoholics for the "crime" of
purchasing liquor.25 0  The Robinson Court seemingly intended to craft a
248 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 98 (1961). As Jacobs
notes (using slightly dated terminology), the socially marginal tend to favor the parts of
cities that have already been abandoned by the upper strata: "The perverts who completely
took over Philadelphia's Washington Square for several decades were a manifestation of this
city behavior, in microcosm. They did not kill off a vital and appreciated park. They did not
drive out respectable users. They moved into an abandoned place and entrenched
themselves." Id.
249 See Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
250 See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 122 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
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constitutional principle that would prevent such results. If judges can look
to an objective standard for applying the Robinson doctrine there will be no
danger that the doctrine will de-criminalize conduct that is truly culpable.
By focusing on the question of whether targeted conduct is innocent or
culpable, judges and lawmakers can look to objective standards of
determining whether a law punishes innocent people because of their status.
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